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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-VENUE-FEDERAL OFFENSES CoMMITI'ED OUTSIDE 
THE Jurusn1arroN OF ANY STATE OR DISTRICT-The defendant, an army staff 
sergeant, was under custody at Fort Meade, Maryland, awaiting disposition of 
charges of sodomy lodged against him under the Articles of War. After a delay 
of four months, the charges were dropped and he was shipped by the Army to 
Fort Jay, New York, where he was separated from the service. Immediately 
upon his release, he was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under 
a commissioner's warrant charging him with tr~on committed in Japan during 
a prior enlistment in the army. At the trial in the District Court for the South-
ern District of New York, the issue of venue was submitted to the jury and was 
found to be proper. Venue was governed by a federal statute which provides 
that "the trial of all offenses begun or committed . . . out of the jurisdiction of 
any particular State or district, shall be in the district where the offender is 
found, or into which he is £rst brought."1 After conviction, with the cooperation 
of the Army, the defendant obtained confidential records not previously avail-
able; these records showed that the Army had brought the defendant to New 
York at the request of the Department of Justice for the purpose of turning him 
over to the FBI. On the basis of this newly discovered evidence, the defendant 
moved to vacate the conviction for improper venue. 2 The district court denied 
the motion. · On appeal, held,. reversed. Had the newly discovered evidence 
118 U.S.C. (1952) §3238. This provision is derived from 1 Stat. L. 113, §8 
(1790), which provided that the trial "shall be in the district where the offender is appre-
hended, or into which he may first be brought." No explanation of the change in language 
from "apprehended" to "found" could be found. Ex Parte Bollman, 4 Cranch (8 U.S.) 
74 (1807), involved a factual situation amazingly similar to that of the principal case and 
reached the same result under the 1790 statute. 
2 28 U.S.C. (1952) §2255 authorizes this procedure. 
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been before the jury, they could not have found that the defendant was "found" 
in the Southern District of New York; he was "found" in Maryland within the 
meaning of the federal venue statute. United States v. Provoo, (2d Cir. 1954) 
215 F. (2d) 531. 
Misuse of the terms "jurisdiction," "venue,'' and "vicinage" in the area of 
federal criminal practice frequently tends to obscure procedural issues. For this 
reason some precision in definition is needed to appraise the cases in this ·field. As 
to "jurisdiction," Congress has provided that the federal district courts "shall 
have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses 
against the laws of the United States."3 Under this statute, if the defendant acts 
in violation of a federal criminal statute, jurisdiction of all federal district courts 
of the offense committed is automatically established.4 As to "venue,'' Article 
III of the Constitution states that the trial of all crimes "shall be held in the 
State where said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed 
within any State, the trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may 
by Law have directed."5 It has been settled by judicial decision that this pro-
vision for the place of trial confers personal rights on the accused which he may 
waive at his election.6 It has further been established that in criminal trials in 
the federal courts venue must be alleged in the indictment and proved at the 
trial just as all other material allegations.7 The concept of venue, then, involves 
the personal rights of a defendant, as opposed to jurisdiction, which involves 
the judicial power of the court. 8 As to "vicinage,'' the Sixth Amendment pro-
vides that ''In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to • • • 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law. 
3 18 u.s.c. (1952) §3231. 
4 Note that the statute speaks of jurisdiction "of all offenses"; in this country criminal 
jurisdiction "over the person" of the defendant is never a problem since the defendant 
must be in court in order to be tried. In other countries provision is made for what might 
be called a "default conviction," similar in procedure to our civil default judgment. See 
Delaume, "Jurisdiction over Crimes Committed Abroad: French and American Law," 21 
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 173 (1952). 
5 u.s. CoNsT., art. m, §2. 
a Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 52 S.Ct. 417 (1932); United States v. 
Jones, (2d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 72; Earnest v. United States, (6th Cir. 1952) 198 F. 
(2d) 561; Levine v. United States, (8th Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 556. But cf. United 
States v. Bink, (D.C. Ore. 1947) 74 F. Supp. 603, and United States v. Holdsworth, 
(D.C. Me. 1949) 9 F.R.D. 198. 
1 United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 65 S.Ct. 249 (1944); United States v. 
Strew!, (2d Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 474. In the absence of waiver, the issue of improper 
venue may be raised at any time. United States v. Brothman, (2d Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 
70. 
s The lower court in the principal case evidently considered venue to be a part of the 
overall requirement of jurisdiction of the offense. In United States v. Provoo, (D.C. N.Y. 
1954) 124 F. Supp. 185, the court said at 188: "It is thus essential to the jurisdiction, and 
hence the validity of the judgment of this court, that the petitioner be shown to have been 
'found' in this district. . •• " 
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••• " 9 The place of trial is not involved here; the amendment dictates only the 
place from which the jury must be summoned. Vicinage also comes within the 
category of personal rights which may be waived by the defendant.10 It re-
mains to determine the impact of these principles in cases where the crime has 
been committed outside the boundaries of any state or district. The jurisdiction 
of the federal courts should not be affected at all by this fact since a federal 
criminal statute11 has been violated. To narrow the problem further, the vicinage 
provision of the Sixth Amendment can have no possible application here since 
the crime did not occur in a district "previously ascertained by law.''12 Venue 
remains as the crucial issue. As applied to the facts of the present case, the 
venue statute provided that the defendant be tried in the district where he was 
"found.''13 The trial court correctly defined this term as meaning the district in 
which the defendant was "£.rst apprehended or arrested or taken into custody, 
under charges later found in the indictment."14 This requirement serves the 
single purpose of prohibiting the government from picking the place of trial 
most favorable for conviction; it leaves the place of trial to be determined by the 
chance circumstance of the place of apprehension.15 Considered in the light 
of the policy underlying the venue statute, the facts of the present case present 
a clear attempt by the Department of Justice to violate this policy.16 All other 
charges against him having been dropped, it is clear that the defendant was in 
fact being held in custody at Fort Meade for the crime of treason; the fact that 
he was held there by the Anny rather than the FBI does not materially alter the 
situation.17 The necessity, in terms of protection to the accused, for enactment 
of the venue statute may well be questioned.18 But faced with the existence of 
the statute, the result reached in the principal case was inevitable. 
Richard R. Dailey 
9 U.S. CoNST., amend. VI. See Blume, "The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases," 43 
MICH. L REv. 59 (1944). 
10 Hagner v. United States, note 6 supra. 
11 Note 3 supra. 
12 See note 9 supra. Chandler v. United States, (1st Cir. 1949) 171 F. (2d) 921. 
13 Note 1 supra. For interpretation of the "first brought" clause, see United States v. 
Burgman, (D.C. D.C. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 568; Chandler v. United States, note 12 supra. 
14 See note 1 supra. The change in wording from "apprehended" to "found" does not 
seem to have effected any change in meaning. United States v. Townsend, (D.C. N.Y.) 
1915) 219 F. 761. 
15 The place of apprehension may still be controlled by the government, within the 
limits of the statute of limitation, by merely waiting for the defendant to move voluntarily 
to another judicial district. 
16 It is interesting to note that 31 Stat. L. 330 (1900), 10 U.S.C. (1952) §15, makes 
it a crime to use any part of the Army of the United States as a posse comitatus. 
17 Principal case at 538. 
18 Comparable state venue statutes often leave some choice as to the place of trial in 
the hands of the prosecution. See Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §45.10 (crimes committed 
on Lake Michigan). 
